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Abstract 
 
Search advertising and display advertising are two 
major online advertising formats. Search advertising 
emphasizes ads’ click-through effect. Advertisers only 
pay when users click the link of their ads. Traditional 
display advertising emphasizes ads’ impression effect. 
Most display ads are charged based on the number of 
views on the ads. Considering that most online ads 
increase brand awareness (impression effect) and 
directly promote sales (click-through effect), the not-
emphasized effect in search advertising or display 
advertising actually has a significant impact on the 
market outcome. However, these impacts have been 
largely ignored. In this paper, we examine various 
mechanisms in search and display advertising by 
considering both ads’ impression effect and click-
through effect. Interestingly, we show a seesaw 
relationship between ads’ two effects in search 
advertising. The advertiser whose advertisement has a 
strong click-through effect benefits relatively less from 
its impression effect. In display advertising, the real-
time-bidding (RTB) mechanism considers both ads’ 
impression effect and click-through effect. It allows a 
publisher to gain more surplus than that through a 
static auction. However, we show that RTB is 
associated with a high risk of market failure. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Online advertising has grown fast to become the 
leading advertising format. It’s estimated that internet 
advertising will overtake TV advertising revenue in 
2017 [1]. Search advertising and display advertising 
are two dominant online advertising formats. Search 
ads, done by the search engine, are usually placed to 
elicit an immediate performance, especially for a click. 
Advertisers only pay when users click the links of their 
advertisements. So advertisers in search advertising 
are always focused on the “click-through effect” of ads. 
Most display ads, which are posted for publicizing a 
product or an upcoming event, are used to create 
impressions. They are always charged based on the 
number of views of the ads, so in display advertising; 
ads’ impression effect is emphasized. Considering that 
online ads do not only increase brand awareness 
(impression effect) but may also  directly promote 
sales (click-through effect), the not-emphasized effect 
in search advertising or display advertising, which 
actually has a significant impact on the market 
outcome, is largely ignored or covered by the shadow 
of the other effects. In addition, under the trend of 
customized advertising, a new technology, Real Time 
Bidding (RTB), has been introduced into traditional 
display advertising. That means, based on the big data 
of online users’ information, more targeted ads are 
delivered via advertisers’ RTB auction. RTB display 
advertising, represented by DoubleClick, RightMedia, 
has been growing so fast that the advertising spending 
of American is expected to reach 9.03 billion dollars 
by 2017, accounting for 29% of total display 
advertising spending [2]. Compared with traditional 
display advertising, it evolves from “slot buying” into 
“impression buying”. This new model achieves brand 
awareness as well as considers the ads’ customization, 
and thus it combines two effects together and could be 
regarded as the third advertising format combining the 
traditional display advertising and search advertising. 
What should be noticed is the different 
mechanisms of the three advertising formats. The 
fixed-price contract pricing scheme of traditional 
display advertising has changed to the individual-
based real-time auction in RTB display advertising. 
This is also different from the static auction of search 
advertising. Stimulated by the two effects and from the 
perspective of different mechanisms in three 
advertising formats, we expect to explore the impact 
of ignored effect and examine if the newly introduced 
technology is more advantageous than the former ones. 
In this paper, we study the cases where two 
advertisers compete for one advertising slot provided 
by a search engine (search advertising) or a publisher 
(display advertising). Click-through rate is a measure 
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of the effectiveness of promoting sales, which is 
labeled as the click-through effect. The more an ad 
matches a user’s preference, the higher chance the user 
has to click the link of the ad. Impression is often used 
as a measure of increased brand awareness.  Every 
time an ad is displayed on a page, an impression has 
occurred, even if the user never clicks on it. So we 
assume there exists a constant impression effect each 
time the ad appears on a page. In search advertising, 
the rule of second weighted unit price is adopted to 
select the winners. In RTB advertising, the rule of 
second price auction is used. In traditional display 
advertising, the first price auction is adopted. 
Our research shows that the ignored effect will 
incentivize advertisers to bid higher than when just 
considering the main effect and will make all players 
generate extra profit, especially for the platform. 
Therefore, the platform has an incentive to broadcast 
the ignored effect. Interestingly, two effects work in a 
consistent direction with each other in display 
advertising but keep a seesaw relationship in search 
advertising. To answer the question of mechanism, we 
find that the newly introduced RTB display 
advertising is technically and economically advanced 
for the platform, however, it still has the risk of system 
collapse. 
To the best of our knowledge, this research is one 
of the first studies on the mechanisms of different 
advertising formats based on two main effects of 
online advertising. This work makes a contribution to 
the understanding of online advertising by providing a 
more comprehensive analysis of the feature and 
generality of different formats and how they affect all 
the players. It also makes a theoretical contribution to 
the emerging RTB technology by exploring its auction 
mechanism and bidding strategies.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Related literature is discussed in the next section. Then 
we set our basic model for the whole paper. The 
detailed analysis of search advertising and display 
advertising is in the subsequent sections. After that, an 
extension equilibrium analysis is offered. Finally, we 
get our conclusions. 
 
2. Literature 
 
The studies on online advertising and related 
works that we discuss in this paper, draw on three 
streams of literature, the relationship between search 
advertising and display advertising, the different 
auction mechanisms used in online advertising, and 
the new business model of RTB advertising. 
On one hand, different advertising effectiveness is 
emphasized in this paper. Bidders in search 
advertising are always “performance advertisers” who 
place ads in order to elicit an immediate performance, 
whereas many display ads are placed by “brand 
advertisers,” who are instead building awareness [3, 4].  
However, advertisers could achieve two effects 
simultaneously no matter which kind of advertising 
format is adopted. Google and Ipsos MediaCT ran 
over 60 search experiments in 2013 in hopes of 
understanding how search ads affect brand awareness. 
As part of the studies, 800 U.S. consumers participated 
in the simulated-search scenarios. The study found 
that search ads do in fact have a positive impact on 
brand awareness which was published in 2014. At the 
same time, Fulgoni and Mörn presented that online 
display advertisements affected consumer behavior 
and that there were latency effects between branding 
effects and sales lifts even when click rates were 
minimal [5]. Only a limited number of studies examine 
the interaction between the two main effects and thus 
inspired by the practical problem and theoretical 
research, two effects are considered simultaneously in 
this paper. 
Our research is also relevant to the literature on 
online advertising auctions. The mostly studied 
auction in online advertising is the one that adopted by 
Google. In 2002, Google started AdWords using 
Generalized Second Price Auction (GSP) [6, 7] and 
then added the ranking factor into its bidding. The 
factor extended from CTRs at start-up to a more 
comprehensive “quality score” by now [8]. In this 
paper, the quality score is represented by CTRs for 
simplification. Following Chen & Stallaert, our 
research  uses second weighted unit-price auctions to 
sell slots and assumes auctions are under a complete-
information setting [9]. Unlike most studies which 
focus on providing a better design of auctions in online 
advertising, in this paper we make it as a given tool to 
better understand the bidding strategy and its 
implication to all players. 
RTB, an emerging and promising practical 
marketing technology, is attractive to researchers 
recently. In limited papers relevant to RTB and from 
the perspective of structure and players, the current 
research topics could mainly be divided into three 
parts [10]. Publishers and SSPs, as the supply side, 
constitute the first perspective. In practice, publishers 
usually sell premium ad inventory to high-quality 
advertisers via contract negotiation on an abundance 
of ad impressions to avoid default, the remnant ad 
inventory is sold through RTB to get the best matches. 
Hence how to allocate the different channels, how to 
optimize reserved price, and how to make revenue 
optimization are hot research questions. For instance, 
Balseiro et al., considers the tradeoff between the real-
time revenue with the long-time benefits of traditional 
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reservation-based ad contracts, formalized the 
combined allocation problem as multi-objective 
stochastic control problem and designed an efficient 
policy for online ad allocation [11]. Fridgeirsdottir et 
al. determined the publisher’s optimal pricing in 
display advertising faced with uncertain setting [12]. 
Contract to supply side, the second perspective is 
advertisers and DSPs which are the demand side of 
RTB. They are willing to bid and pay for the best-
matched ad impressions using the real-time auction. 
Therefore, the bidding behavior and strategies are 
appealing to researchers and attract intensive eyeball. 
Balseiro et al. introduced the notion of a fluid mean-
field equilibrium (FMFE) that is behaviorally 
appealing and computationally tractable, and in some 
important cases, it has a closed-form characterization.  
The rational behavior of advertisers could be 
approximated well in the context of budget- 
constrained by FMFE [13]. Actually, DSPs are the 
proxy of advertisers which play the intermediary role 
between AD Exchange (AdX) and advertisers in RTB 
market. Each DSP chooses the highest bids from 
advertisers at first and then AdX picks out the highest 
one from different DSPs, so there exists a two-stage 
second price auction, and thus the selection of the 
appropriate algorithms and the balance of revenue 
between advertisers and DSPs are important issues to 
DSPs. As mentioned before, AdX, as the most critical 
component in RTB, is the marketplace where 
publishers sell their ads inventory and advertisers buy 
impressions via the auction mechanism. In this part, 
the key research issue is mainly about auction 
mechanism design. It has been proved that the optimal 
mechanism is second price sealed bid auction. 
However, there exists the problem of imperfect 
truthful bids submitting by DSPs because of the two-
stage auction. In order to deal with this problem, a 
mechanism called “optional second-price” (OSP) 
auction is introduced which practically used by 
Google DoubleClick[14]. Another mechanism named 
“BIN-TAC” is also theoretically proved to be effective 
[15, 16]. These papers are mostly related to the bidding 
strategy of advertisers and the auction mechanism of 
AdX. In order to focus on the research question, the 
role of DSPs is ignored and thus the auction is 
simplified to one-stage auction. Our research 
contributes to this stream of literature by comparing 
the different mechanisms adopted by different 
advertising formats and how the promising newly 
technology works. 
 
3. Model Setup  
 
Considering two advertisers compete for one 
advertising slot offered by a platform. Ads from two 
advertisers match each user’s requirement to different 
degrees, at the same time the users have different 
preference to the advertisements which will result in 
different clicking probabilities on ads.  
A standard Hotelling model is suggested to 
measure the fitness between advertisers and users. 
Two advertisers, indexed by  𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵 , stand at the 
opposite ends of the unit length  [0,1] . Users, 
normalized to one unit, uniformly distributed along the 
line. The distance between a user and an advertiser 
describes the degree of matching between them which 
will be translated into different clicking probabilities. 
The most targeted user for an advertiser is the one 
whose location is the same with the advertiser. The 
remaining users match the advertiser decreasing with 
the distance. Therefore, assume 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  is the maximum 
probability that the most targeted user clicks the ads 
from advertiser  𝑖𝑖 . For the other users, the click 
probability decays along the distance with decay factor 
𝑟𝑟 . So a user located at 𝑥𝑥  from advertiser 𝐴𝐴 has the 
expected click-through rates of 𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥)and𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�1 −
𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)�from advertiser 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵 respectively.  
Denote the unit value that advertiser 𝑖𝑖 derives from 
each click is  𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 . Then Advertiser 𝐴𝐴(𝐵𝐵)  has the 
expected value of 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥)(𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)�) 
from the user at 𝑥𝑥.  These benefits coming from clicks 
on the advertisement can be regarded as the “click-
through effect”. 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 is their maximum expected value 
from the most targeted user’s click. Any other user has 
a discount value to advertiser 𝑖𝑖 by the distance, which 
means the click-through effect decays with the degree 
of matching. Opposite to that, the impression effect 
has no relationship with the ads’ fitness. Each time an 
ad is shown to a user, an impression occurs no matter 
the user clicks it or not. Suppose the impression effect 
is constant, the advertiser derives a value of 𝑠𝑠 from 
each view. 
Two advertisers have full information about each 
other’s value, maximum clicking probabilities (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) and 
also have good knowledge of each users’ preference 
which means two advertisers know the location 
information of each other. In addition to that, the decay 
factor (𝑟𝑟 ) is common knowledge. Two advertisers can 
optimize their utilities and take the best response. We 
will use the same basic model setup to study three 
advertising formats which have the different context, 
pricing scheme, and auction mechanisms. 
 
4. Search advertising  
 
In search advertising, suppose there is one 
advertising slot offered by the search engine. Each 
advertiser bids for the chosen keywords of ads. The 
search engine matches users’ queries with ads’ 
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keywords and then assigns the ad slot to the advertiser. 
The mechanism used by the search engine to sell 
advertising slots is a second weighted unit-price 
auction, which is the most widely adopted approach 
based on Google’s algorithm. Advertisers bid on cost 
per click (CPC) and the winner is chosen by their 
expected ad payments based on the cost-per-click bids. 
A quality score will be given to each potential ad to 
measure the expected number of clicks. As click-
through rate (CTR) is the most important factor 
defining quality score and is highly correlated to the 
latter, we use CTR to represent quality score for 
simplification in this model. The expected ad payment 
is the product of the bidded CPC and the quality score 
/ CTR. The advertiser with the largest expected 
payment wins the auction and pays the second largest 
expected payment. In the case of two advertisers’ 
auction, the one who wins the auction will pay the 
other one’s proposed payment. 
According to the pricing scheme and payment rule, 
advertisers pay only for clicks, not impressions. So in 
search advertising, the click-through effect is the main 
effect. Actually, the impression effect also plays a role 
because of the display behavior on the search result 
webpages no matter the user clicks it or not. However, 
it hasn’t been charged by the search engine and is often 
ignored in the previous papers. If the impression effect 
is taken into account, the extra effect will influence 
advertisers’ bidding strategies and then result in profit 
changes for the search engine and two advertisers.  
As in the basic model, suppose the impression 
effect is s  and two advertisers preset the bid price 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 , 
each time the user 𝑥𝑥  clicks on the ads from two 
advertisers, the advertisers are expected to pay  
𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥)  or 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)�  to the search 
engine respectively. The marginal user  ?̅?𝑥 who is no 
difference to the search engine when bidding 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴, 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵  is: 
𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝑟?̅?𝑥) = 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵(1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − ?̅?𝑥)) 
?̅?𝑥 = 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴−𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵(1−𝑟𝑟)(𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴+𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟   
With two advertisers’ bidding price, the search 
engine segments the whole market into two parts. The 
users in the interval [0, ?̅?𝑥]  will be targeted to 
advertiser  𝐴𝐴 ’s advertisement, which is  𝐴𝐴  ’s market 
share; on the other hand,  [?̅?𝑥, 1]is the market share for 
advertiser 𝐵𝐵  . 
For advertisers 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵 , their expected profits come 
from three parts, the first one represents click-through 
effect, the second is impression effect and the last one 
is the expected payment of advertisers. 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 =  ∫ 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥?̅?𝑥0 + ∫ 𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥?̅?𝑥0   
−∫ 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵
?̅?𝑥
0
𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥  
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 =  ∫ 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1?̅?𝑥 + ∫ 𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 1?̅?𝑥   
−∫ 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥)1?̅?𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥  
Lemma 1:   Equilibrium bidding strategies are 
𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴 = 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴 �1 + 𝑠𝑠2−𝑟𝑟 � 1𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 + 1𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴��  
𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵 = 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 �1 + 𝑠𝑠2−𝑟𝑟 � 1𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 + 1𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴��  
And the larger the impression effect, the larger the bid 
which means the ignored impression effect will push 
advertisers to bid higher to win the auction.  
Lemma 1 also shows Advertisers’ optimal bids are 
proportional to their values.  
1) 𝑠𝑠 = 0 , 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 . If two advertisers do not 
recognize the benefit of impression effect, or they 
haven’t put the impression effect into consideration in 
their bidding strategies, the advertisers bid their true 
values. This result is consistent with the claims of 
previous literature and can be regarded as the 
benchmark case.  
2) 𝑠𝑠 > 0 , 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 .When impression effect is 
considered by two advertisers, the impression effect 
pushes advertisers to bid higher than their values to 
win the auction. The increased bidding values are 
proportional to the benefit of impression effect and 
affected by the click-through effects of both 
advertisers as well.  
Lemma 2: Impression effect will not affect the market 
share/coverage of the two ads when impression effect 
is constant to all visitors.  
The location of the marginal user has not changed 
with and without of the impression effect: 
?̅?𝑥 = 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴−𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵(1−𝑟𝑟)(𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴+𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟 = 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴−𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵(1−𝑟𝑟)(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴+𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟 = ?̅?𝑥′  
If considering only the click-through effect, each 
user has a different probability of making a 
contribution 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴, 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵 to the search engine respectively. 
For users in the left part[0, ?̅?𝑥′], they generate more 
revenue when showing ads from advertiser  𝐴𝐴 rather 
than𝐵𝐵; vice versa. In that case, the market shares are 
determined by the search engine based on the marginal 
user. No changes in market share when considering the 
extra impression effect is very intuitive in that the 
utility of impression effect is the same for two 
advertisers so they have an equivalent increase in the 
bidding price in equilibrium. And the market share is 
positively related to its own click-through, but 
negatively correlated to its competitors’. 
Lemma 3: There is a seesaw relationship between 
impression effect and click-through effect in search 
advertising. 
Denote 1 + 𝑠𝑠
2−𝑟𝑟
�
1
𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵
+ 1
𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴
�  as 𝑀𝑀 . An 
advertiser’s optimal bid is 𝑀𝑀 times of the value that 
the advertiser gains from each click. The increase of 
bidding price results from the extra impression effect. 
From this sense, 𝑀𝑀 can be regarded as the multiplier 
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of impression effect. From the mathematical 
expression, on one hand, 𝑀𝑀 increases with 𝑠𝑠; on the 
other hand, 𝑀𝑀  has a negative correlation with, 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 
and 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵, in which 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 can be seen as the indicator 
of click-through effect for the advertisers. Therefore, 
there is a seesaw relationship between impression 
effect and click-through effect. If the click-through 
effect is more important to the advertiser, the 
impression effect will lower down and 
correspondingly the increased degree of bids for the 
slot is not that much. 
Table 1 (see Appendix) summarizes the profits of 
two advertisers and the search engine when 
considering the impression effect or not.   
Proposition 1: When considering the impression 
effect in search advertising, the platform and two 
advertisers share the increased profit. The platform 
increases the higher profit percentage than two 
advertisers and the advertiser whose advertisement has 
a strong click-through effect benefits relatively less 
from the advertisement’s impression effect.  
From the analysis above, we can find that the 
original profits of two advertisers without impression 
effect are increasing with their own click-through 
effect and decreasing with the opponent’s. This means 
that when click-through effect is the only 
consideration, the two advertisers compete on the 
click-through effect and the one with the higher click-
through effect gains a larger size market segment. 
When impression effect is considered, the profit of the 
platform (search engine) and two advertisers are all 
increased, they share the increased surplus resulting 
from the impression effect (Δ𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ,Δ𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴 ,Δ𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 > 0).  
The increased percentage of profit 
Δ𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
′ , Δ𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴′ , Δ𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴′  
which is positive to the unit value 𝑠𝑠 can also be viewed 
as the result of the impression effect, among them the 
platform increases the highest profit percentage 
(which is the sum of two advertisers 
Δ𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
′ = Δ𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴′ +
Δ𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴
′ ) ) than two advertisers. Numerically, the platform 
also increases up to 𝑀𝑀  times of  𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴′ . The benefit 
which results from higher bidding price is all directly 
transferred into the platform, so it’s understandable 
that the platform increases the same degree 𝑀𝑀 with the 
bidding price. As for two advertisers, on one hand, 
they benefit from the impression effect, on the other 
hand, the payment also rises because of the opponent’s 
higher bids, so the increased percentages of two 
advertisers are lower than the platform. Another 
interesting finding is that the increased percentage is 
an inverse correlation to the click effect whereby the 
platform is negatively related to both of advertisers’ 
click effects and each advertiser has a negative 
relationship with its own click effect respectively. 
That means there is a larger increased percentage for 
an advertiser who has a lower click effect, so the small 
advertiser will benefit more when considering the 
impression effect. It’s proven that there is a tradeoff 
between click effect and impression effect.  
From the perspective of the platform, it has been 
proven theoretically that the platform has incentives to 
broadcast the impression effect accompanied with the 
search advertising results, it will increase profit for all 
the participants, especially for itself.  
 
5. Display advertising  
 
Display advertising is another important online 
advertising format. This kind of advertising is done by 
the web publishers who post the advertisement on their 
websites. With technology improving, display 
advertising has evolved from the traditional display 
into real-time bidding display advertising. Although 
the main purpose of display advertising is delivering 
general advertisements or events to create or maintain 
brand awareness, these two types have very different 
mechanisms to show the ads.  
 
5.1. Traditional display advertising 
 
In traditional display advertising, advertisers 
would purchase ad slots in bulk in a certain period of 
time by making contracts directly with publishers. The 
same ads with no target will be shown to all visitors. 
The advertisers are charged based on the number of 
views of the ads, therefore impression effect is the 
main consideration for advertisers and publishers. 
Even though it’s used mainly for awareness and 
appearance, it has the probability to attract users’ 
interests, clicks, and even future buying. 
Unfortunately, click-through effect is not frequently 
considered in display advertising. 
Suppose two advertisers compete for an appealing 
ad slot on a website. The basic model setup still works 
for display advertising. What should have been 
noticed is the payment. It’s the first price auction 
instead of second price auction in traditional display 
advertising which means the publisher chooses the 
advertiser with the highest bid to sell the ad slot.  
Lemma 4 When only considering impression effect 𝑠𝑠, 
two advertisers are both willing to pay s which is the 
true value for the slot and get zero profit. So there is 
no difference for the platform to assign the slot to any 
advertiser and the profit of the platform is 𝑠𝑠.  
𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
′ = 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴′ = 𝑠𝑠 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
′ = 𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴′ = 0, 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴′ = 𝑠𝑠 
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When considering the benefit of click-through 
effect in traditional display advertising, the new values 
of two advertisers are respectively:  
𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 = ∫ 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥10 + ∫ 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥)10 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥  = 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴(1 − 12 𝑟𝑟)  
𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 = ∫ 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥10 + ∫ 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)�10 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥  = 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵(1 − 12 𝑟𝑟)  
According to the rule of first price auction in 
traditional advertising, if 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 > 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 , advertiser 𝐵𝐵 
will not bid more than 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵(1 − 12 𝑟𝑟) , so that 
advertiser A only needs to bid a little more than 𝐵𝐵   to 
win the auctions + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 �1 − 12 𝑟𝑟� + 𝜀𝜀; and if 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 >
𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 , 𝐵𝐵  will bid s + 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 �1 − 12 𝑟𝑟� + 𝜀𝜀   to be the 
winner. The advertiser with higher click-through 
effect will post a higher bid than 𝑠𝑠 and acquire extra 
profit. The platform is expected to acquire more profit s + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 �1 − 12 𝑟𝑟� + 𝜀𝜀 instead of 𝑠𝑠. At this time, two 
effects work consistently with each other. This is in 
contrast to the relationship in the search advertising.  
If    𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 > 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = (𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 − 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵) �1 − 12 𝑟𝑟� − 𝜀𝜀,   𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴 = 0  
𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 �1 − 12 𝑟𝑟� + 𝜀𝜀  
If  𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 > 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 
  𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 0,𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴 = (𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 − 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴) �1 − 12 𝑟𝑟� − ε  𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 �1 − 12 𝑟𝑟� + 𝜀𝜀  
Lemma 5 When considering click-through effect in 
traditional display advertising, the winning bid will be 
higher. Hence, the platform is expected to acquire 
more profit than s. 
 
5.2. RTB display advertising 
 
Under RTB display advertising, the ad slot would 
be sold in real-time to the highest bidder based on each 
individual impression via the auction mechanism. The 
“slot buying” of traditional display advertising has 
changed into “individual impression buying” of RTB 
advertising, therefore users with different preferences 
will be shown different ads. Although they both use an 
auction mechanism to determine the winner, there is a 
difference between search advertising’s keyword 
auction and individual-oriented auction in RTB 
display advertising. In the keyword auction, it is a one-
bidding action, while in RTB, the advertisers are 
competing for each visitors’ impression. The second 
difference among them is that it’s the advertisers 
themselves who choose to take part in each auction 
with RTB display advertising, but for other two 
formats, the allocation is made by the platform. 
RTB, which matches ads with users on an 
individual basis, brings the chance to consider not only 
the impression effect of the traditional display, but also 
naturally takes users’ click-through action into 
consideration. In that way, the bidding strategies of 
advertisers will change accordingly.   
Suppose two advertisers bid 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥,𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 for each 
display opportunity. Click-through effects and 
impression effects are denoted as the same as in the 
model of search advertising. Following the literature 
[9], when considering two effects simultaneously in 
RTB advertising, we consider the weakly dominant 
bidding strategies by the advertisers.  
Lemma 6: In the interval of [0, 𝑥𝑥�] , advertiser  𝐴𝐴 
always bids higher than advertiser 𝐵𝐵 , 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 > 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 , 
bidding its total true value is advertiser 𝐵𝐵’s weakly 
dominant strategy which is 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵(1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)) ; 
opposite to that, in the interval [𝑥𝑥�, 1], advertiser 𝐵𝐵 bids 
higher than advertiser  𝐴𝐴 , 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 > 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 , and 
advertiser 𝐴𝐴’s weakly dominant strategy is bidding its 
true value 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥). 
When advertisers auction off each impression to 
show ads to individuals, the bids stem from two parts: 
the part of  s  is completely transferred from 
impression effect into the bid, which means the 
impression effect doesn’t influence the bids in RTB 
display advertising. The other part coming from the 
click-through effect, is the expected value of one click. 
Or it could be viewed as the total value 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖  
discounted by the distance, so the more precise the 
user matching the advertiser, the higher the 
advertiser’s bid to the user.  
Lemma 7: When considering two effects in RTB 
display advertising, it achieves the same market 
segmentation with that in search advertising, although 
they have different auction mechanisms.  
The marginal user in RTB display advertising 
is 𝑥𝑥� = 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴−𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵(1−𝑟𝑟)(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴+𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟 . The marginal user is the same 
as that in search advertising. In search advertising, the 
search engine assigns the users according to the 
advertisers’ bids multiplied by the click-through rates. 
In RTB, the two advertisers bid based on each user’s 
characteristic. Although they have different paradigms, 
they bring out the same segmentation results.  
The profits of two advertisers and the platform 
when considering two effects, are: 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = ∫ 𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 + ∫ 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥?̅?𝑥0?̅?𝑥0    
−∫ 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 ?̅?𝑥0   
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴 =  ∫ 𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 1?̅?𝑥 + ∫ 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1?̅?𝑥   
−∫ 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥
1
?̅?𝑥
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥    
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𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = ∫ 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 + ∫ 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥1?̅?𝑥?̅?𝑥0   
Lemma 8 If impression effect is the only effect taken 
into account in RTB display advertising, two 
advertisers will have the same bids, which equal to the 
value of the impression 𝑠𝑠. Consequently their expected 
profits are zero from each auction. The platform’s 
expected profit is 𝑠𝑠. 
If only impression effect is considered in RTB 
display advertising, the equilibrium outcome is the 
same as that in the traditional display advertising. 
Proposition 2 When considering two effects in RTB 
display advertising, the bidding price increases , the 
platform and two advertisers all generate extra profit 
compared with the case when only considering the 
impression effect. What’s more important, the 
advanced advertiser with higher click-through effect 
benefits more than the one with lower click-through 
effect.  
When comparing the bidding strategy and the 
profits without and with click-through effect under 
RTB (see Table 2 in Appendix), the extra effect pushes 
two advertisers to bid aggressively than before. The 
bids are not blind but correlated to users’ 
characteristics and click-through effect. Furthermore, 
the increased payments which result from the 
increased bids by advertisers benefit the platform. The 
platform and two advertisers all acquire increased 
profit and thus achieve Pareto improvement because 
of the ignored click-through effect (∆𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴,∆𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 ,∆𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 >0). As a consequence, when the platform uses RTB, 
the ads are forced to be targeted. The targeting makes 
the click-through effect intensively added on the 
impression effect which results in higher bidding price 
and then more profits for the platform and advertisers. 
It forms a dynamic loop from ads targeting to bids and 
leading to profit. Another notable thing is the 
increased profit of each advertiser is positively related 
to its own click-through effect and inversely related to 
the opponent’s, so it’s more beneficial to the advanced 
advertiser with higher click-through effect than the 
advertiser with the lower one. And for the platform, 
it’s understandable to recognize the consistent 
direction of two effects which is in contrast to the 
inverse correlation conclusion in search advertising. 
 
RTB- Combination of two advertising formats 
Corollary 1: An interesting finding is that RTB is a 
perfect combination of search advertising and 
traditional display advertising, which only considers 
their main effects, or it could be said RTB is a perfect 
combination of two effects.  
From table 3 (see Appendix), it can be seen that the 
platform and two advertisers’ profits under RTB are 
the sum of the profits in search advertising without 
impression effect and the profits in traditional display 
advertising without click-through effect. That means 
the newly introduced RTB technology considers and 
combines two effects perfectly. Different advertising 
formats have the tendency towards integration.  
 
6. Comparison of different advertising 
formats under two effects  
 
When considering two effects in three advertising 
formats, the extra effect will stimulate the advertiser to 
bid higher than when just considering one effect. 
However, from the perspective of mechanism design, 
search advertising and display advertising are 
essentially different. In search advertising, advertisers 
preset the bidding price for keywords and then the 
search engine allocates the ad placement to two 
advertisers which is a one-shot action. As to traditional 
display advertising, the publisher allocates the ad slot 
to only one advertiser. The principle is getting all or 
nothing at all. In RTB display advertising, advertisers 
themselves decide to auction for each user impression 
which is a dynamic behavior. 
Lemma 9 From the angle of the platform, the profits 
are all increased under three cases when considering 
two effects, but  𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 > 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 > 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴. 
First prove 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 > 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 . In search advertising, the 
extra profit from impression effect is shared by all 
players, including two advertisers and the search 
engine, but in RTB display advertising, the platform 
acquires the total profit which is completely 
transferred, not only from the impression effect but 
also from the click-through effect (Corollary 1). This 
means, using RTB auction, based on individuals, is a 
more beneficial way to improve profit compared with 
the classical static auction in search advertising. RTB 
changes the auction mechanism in online advertising, 
and it allows the platform to gain more surplus than 
that through a static auction. 
Then we compare the profits in two display 
advertising formats and can prove 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 > 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 .  
Actually, it’s the first price auction in traditional 
display advertising, but a variant of the second price 
auction in RTB which results in platform’s lower 
profit. It’s reasonable to understand that the premium 
inventory of display advertising is still using 
traditional advertising, and the remnant inventory is 
using RTB. 
As for advertisers, the results are inversed under 
three formats 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 < 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 < 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. In traditional display 
advertising, the advertiser’s profit is either o or very 
small, in RTB the advertisers share the part of profit 
coming from the click-through effect, and in search 
advertising they also share the part of profit from the 
impression effect, which results in a more total profit 
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than that in RTB display advertising. As a whole, 
search advertising is more beneficial to advertisers 
than display advertising. 
Proposition 3: RTB completely changes the auction 
mechanism in online advertising, and it allows a 
platform to gain more surplus than that with a static 
auction, but it still has some weakness compared with 
the traditional display advertising. From the 
perspective of advertisers, it’s better for them to 
choose search advertising rather than display 
advertising.  (see Table 4 in Appendix) 
  
7. Extension about the equilibrium results 
 
When considering two effects in RTB display 
advertising, the weakly dominant strategy is rational 
and of great significance. Two advertisers bid for each 
impression to show ads on the ad slot, as a result, the 
whole market is segmented into two parts. In the part 
that is more correlated to 𝐴𝐴’s ads, advertiser 𝐵𝐵 bids its 
true value which is similar to the result in the private 
second-price auction. Advertiser  𝐴𝐴 only needs to bid 
higher than 𝐵𝐵’s true value and will win the auction. So 
for the platform, the bid of the advertiser with smaller 
click-through effect is equal to the lower bound of the 
bids. This weakly dominant equilibrium looks perfect 
for all the parties including the platform and two 
advertisers. However, the equilibrium which we get in 
the former analysis is just one of equilibriums, it’s not 
a general equilibrium. From the general equilibrium, 
we find that it may bring out system collapse due to 
the low bid of the opponent.  
Lemma 10: In the interval [0, 𝑥𝑥�] , the equilibrium 
bidding strategies of two advertisers are {(𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 , 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥)|𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 ∈ �𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�1 − 𝑟𝑟(1 − 𝑥𝑥)�, +∞�, 
𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 ∈ [0, 𝑠𝑠 + 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥)], 𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 ≥ 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥}. 
Advertiser  𝐴𝐴 always bids higher or at least equal 
to advertiser 𝐵𝐵 (𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 > 𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 ), and thus advertiser  𝐴𝐴 
wins the auction. Under this situation, advertiser 𝐵𝐵 has 
a possibility of bidding a low price (maybe zero) to 
give up the auction. Follow the same logic, in the 
interval[𝑥𝑥�, 1], advertiser 𝐵𝐵 bids higher or at least equal 
to advertiser  𝐴𝐴  and wins the auction, in that case, 
advertiser  𝐴𝐴 may have no incentive to take part in the 
auction.  
According to the equilibrium strategies above, 
although RTB can help to increase the accuracy and 
efficiency of ads delivery, it may result in a situation 
where it decreases the advertisers’ competition in an 
auction and even leads to system collapse. This 
situation is demonstrated in practical. For instance, 
empirical research shows that most impressions sold 
in Microsoft AdECN platform can only be matched to 
one to three advertisers. Those impressions that are 
matched to exactly one advertiser will be sold at their 
reserve prices (may be zero). This significantly 
reduces the revenue of AdXs and DSPs, who as a 
result have no incentives to segment their target 
audiences via big-data analysis. In literature, it has 
been empirically proven that the average price of 
impressions first rises and then drops with market 
segmenting. It could be found that the weakly 
dominant equilibrium in Part 5.2 is an ideal result for 
all parties, there are still possibilities of disappointing 
consequences. Measures, such as reserved price needs 
to be introduced to avoid systemic collapse.   
 
8. Conclusion  
 
In search advertising, click-through effect is 
emphasized for its effectiveness and tractability; but in 
display advertising, players usually focus on the 
impression effect. In this paper, we pick up the ignored 
effect in different advertising formats. It’s found that 
the extra effect will push advertisers to bid higher than 
when just considering one effect, and the profits of all 
players, including the platform, increase. An 
interesting seesaw relationship between click-through 
effect and impression effect is illustrated in search 
advertising. The advertiser with lower click-through 
effect gains a smaller market segment through auction, 
but receives more compensation when impression 
effect is taken into consideration in the auction. 
However, in RTB display advertising, the advertiser 
with higher click-through effect will benefit more by 
considering both effects. To sum up, from the 
platform’s perspective, it’s necessary to point out the 
previously ignored effect which may provide an 
increased profit.  
From the view of mechanism design, the 
introduction of RTB is economically advanced. The 
individual based real-time auction mechanism makes 
it a perfect combination of two effects and produces 
the roles of two advertising formats, so that it allows a 
platform to gain more surplus than that through a static 
auction. However, it still has some weakness and may 
have the risk of system collapse.  
As one of the first papers to explore ignored 
advertising effect in online advertising, our study has 
several limitations that future research could address. 
First, we use Hotelling model to describe the bidding 
competition between two advertisers. It will be 
interesting to examine the bidding strategies by three 
or more advertisers, and whether the similar results 
remain satisfied. Second, this research has not 
considered the reserved price mechanism, which is 
prevalently adopted in online advertising auctions. 
Furthermore, this paper provides theoretical 
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equilibrium outcomes under the three online 
advertising formats. It would be better to empirically 
examine the results with real data.  
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Table 1. Profits without and with impression effect in search advertising 
 
Without impression 
(𝑠𝑠 = 0, 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) With impression (𝑠𝑠 > 0, 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) Difference(∆) 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
′ (𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) (𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 − 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟)22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  �1 + 𝑠𝑠2 − 𝑟𝑟 1𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴�𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴′  𝑠𝑠(2 − 𝑟𝑟)(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴)𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴′  
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴
′ (𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴) (𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵−𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟)22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  �1 + 𝑠𝑠2 − 𝑟𝑟 1𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴′  𝑠𝑠(2 − 𝑟𝑟)(𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴′  
𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
′ (𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴) 2𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 �1 − 12 𝑟𝑟2� − (1 − 𝑟𝑟)2(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴2𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴2 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵2𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵2)2(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  �1 + 𝑠𝑠2 − 𝑟𝑟 � 1𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 1𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵��𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴′  𝑠𝑠2 − 𝑟𝑟 � 1𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 1𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴′  
 
Table 2. Profits without and with click-through effect in RTB display advertising 
 Only 
impression With click-through effect   Difference(∆) 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
′ (𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) 0 �𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 − 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵(1 − 𝑟𝑟)�22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  �𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 − 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵(1 − 𝑟𝑟)�22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴
′ (𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴) 0 �𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 − 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝑟)�22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  �𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 − 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴(1 − 𝑟𝑟)�22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  
𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
′ (𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴) 𝑠𝑠 
𝑠𝑠 + 2𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵(1 − 12 𝑟𝑟2) − (𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴2𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴2 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵2𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵2)(1 − 𝑟𝑟)22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  2𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵(1 − 12 𝑟𝑟2) − (𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴2𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴2 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵2𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵2)(1 − 𝑟𝑟)22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  
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Table 3. Relationship between RTB and two original advertising formats 
 
 Table 4. Comparison of different advertising formats under two effects 
Search without impression Display without click RTB Display (𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 − 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟)22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  0 (𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 − 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟)22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  (𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵−𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟)22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  0 (𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵−𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟)22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  2𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 �1 − 12 𝑟𝑟2� − (1 − 𝑟𝑟)2(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴2𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴2 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵2𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵2)2(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠 + 2𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵(1− 12 𝑟𝑟2) − (𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴2𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴2 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵2𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵2)(1 − 𝑟𝑟)22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  
 
Search advertising 
Display Advertising 
Traditional  RTB advertising 
O
ne
 e
ff
ec
t 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 (𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 − 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟)22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  0 0 
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 (𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵−𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟)22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  0 0 
𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 2𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 �1 − 12 𝑟𝑟2� − (1 − 𝑟𝑟)2(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴2𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴2 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵2𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵2)2(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟   𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠 
Tw
o 
ef
fe
ct
s 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 �1 + 𝑠𝑠2 − 𝑟𝑟 1𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴�𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴′  0 /  (𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 − 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵) �1 − 12 𝑟𝑟� − 𝜀𝜀  (𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 − 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟)22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 
�1 + 𝑠𝑠2 − 𝑟𝑟 1𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵�𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴′  (𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 − 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴) �1 − 12 𝑟𝑟� − 𝜀𝜀 / 0 (𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵−𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟)22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  
𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃 
�1 + 𝑠𝑠2 − 𝑟𝑟 � 1𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 1𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵��𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴′  s + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 �1 − 12 𝑟𝑟� + 𝜀𝜀 𝑠𝑠+ 2𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵(1 − 12 𝑟𝑟2) − (𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴2𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴2 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵2𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵2)(1 − 𝑟𝑟)22(𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑞𝑞𝐴𝐴 + 𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵)𝑟𝑟  
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